

THE CROWNING OF DEMOSTHENES¹

In the course of Demosthenes' lifetime, indeed within a mere decade, the whole balance of power in the Greek world was destroyed. By 338 the city states were completely overshadowed by the national state of Macedon, and it is the concern of all students of Demosthenes to analyse this dramatic change. The task is not easy. The evidence is most unsatisfactory. None of the great historians of the age has survived in other than a few precious fragments, and in the absence of Ephorus, Anaximenes, Theopompus, and the Atthidographers the pale reflections of some of them in Book XVI of Diodorus are poor consolation. It is on the Athenian orators that we have to rely, the very men most concerned in the politics of Athens, in the act of glossing over and denying their own share in the disaster and of misrepresenting that of their opponents. Memories were no longer then than they are today. In 343 both Demosthenes and Aeschines in discussing the events of a mere three years past denied all responsibility for the making of the Peace of Philocrates; one, at least, was lying, confidently. The formal documents were, generally speaking, merely heard, and only in part at that, and the orators were well practised in exploiting such material. If Aeschines and Demosthenes could lie so freely within three years of the events, what they had to say at a longer interval must be much more suspect.

Exchanges of the law-courts inevitably present a picture of vice and corruption, and Greek historians have always to keep clear in mind the great difference in kind of the evidence for the fourth century from that of the fifth. In passing from the historian of the Funeral Oration to, for instance, the charges and counter-charges of the two speeches on the False Embassy, one may be tempted to suppose that Athens had passed into a period of moral decline and that the Athenians upbraided by Demosthenes were not the men their ancestors had been. Again, to take another instance, the shocking state of affairs portrayed in the prosecution of Polycles seems a sad falling-off from the *φιλοτιμία* of the trierarchs on the eve of the Sicilian Expedition². But all this may be deceptive. It is the accident of literature, not a matter of morals, that we lack a Thucydides for the age of Demosthenes, and it is merely the accident of custom that no orations earlier than Antiphon were published.³ Barely an echo of, for instance, the assault made by the young Pericles on Cimon survives to sully his reputation, and without the speeches of Thucydides, son of Melesias, or the prosecution of Callias on his return from Susa, Pericles remains the Olympian. Of wrangles of trierarch against trierarch in the Peloponnesian War there is no sign, but we may be sure that they occurred: the system and the opportunities for a Polycles had been substantially the same. As one reads through the Demosthenic corpus, one is apt to forget all this and uncritically

¹ A condensed version of this paper was delivered to the conference of the Hellenic and Roman Societies at Cambridge in August 1965. The text is, in substance, unchanged, but the part concerning the chronology of the revolt of Agis has been

rewritten to answer the discussion of the matter by Professor Badian in a lecture to the Hellenic Society in November 1965 and now published in *Hermes* xcv (1967).

² [Dem.] 50, Thuc. 6. 31. 3.

³ Plut. *Mor.* 832 D.

to accept that the Athenians had ceased to strive for their country and were content with the leadership of traitors and pacifists, and to explain the rise of Macedon by declaring that the Greeks had come to prefer comfort and narrow self-interest to liberty. A single speech from the age of Pericles in similar vein about decline from the virtue of the warriors of Marathon would have been most salutary for the study of the succeeding century.

It is difficult to answer theorists of moral decline. No doubt there are periods in the life of a nation, as of an army, when morale is low, and it is possible that the fourth century was such a time for Athens. At least, it cannot be disproved. Equally, it cannot be proved. Demosthenes' fervent denunciations of Athenian lassitude, which have been accepted by many as the key to Philip's success, may have been wide of the mark. There may have been the soundest of political considerations governing the opposition of his opponents. We have, generally speaking, to guess what they were. If they were wrong, their errors may have been errors of judgement, not failures of nerve. It is poor use of evidence to accept at their face value Demosthenes' attributions of moral turpitude. Dinarchus could, later on, attack Demosthenes with similar opprobrious charges, which none of us would take literally. Why should Demosthenes receive so much credit with posterity? It certainly simplifies matters if one accepts the burden of his accusations, that he was hindered by traitors and pacifists. One can then neglect the question whether his proposals were practicable; for his opponents were 'guilty men'.

It is not my intention here to engage directly in the debate about the 340s. I may be permitted merely to reassert the view¹ that the central fact of this age is military, not moral—viz. the huge preponderance in military potential of the Macedonian state over the power of any single Greek state. The preponderance was not in mere numbers. The ample supply of manpower was welded into an efficient whole by the military genius of Philip, and trained not just to manoeuvre on the field of battle in such a way that the specialized arms found their most effective use, but also to cover distances at a rate unprecedented in Greek experience. A small Spartan force might arrive at Marathon on the third day, or, led by a Brasidas, dash across Thessaly, but no large Greek force ever attempted such a movement as, for instance, Alexander in 335 when he marched from Illyria to Thebes in thirteen days with his full army through mountainous terrain, a matter of about 250 miles as the crow flies.² To meet such military power, so employed, Greece had to unite, and, no matter how high her morale, unless she did so, she was likely to perish. The real problem for Demosthenes as for his opponents was how to achieve unity, and for historians, if not for moralists, judgement of Demosthenes must rest on his use of opportunities to unite the Greeks.

Here there is ample room for disagreement. For whatever one may say of his resolve, formed in Skirophorion 346,³ to renew the war as soon as possible regardless of the fact that the Macedonian garrison at Thermopylae seemed to secure access to Greece, the Macedonian hold on the Gates was broken, a more

¹ This is the view underlying the various articles I have written on the age of Demosthenes, especially those in *C.Q.* xii (1962), and xiii (1963), and *J.H.S.* lxxxiii (1963).

² Arr. *Anab.* i. 7. 4 f.

³ Despite Dem. 5, Demosthenes showed

his attitude by his attack on Aeschines (Aesch. 2. 96). Cf. *R.E.G.* lxxv (1962), pp. 453 f. for the possibility that Demosthenes still wanted on 16 Skirophorion an expedition to save Phocis.

or less equal force of Greeks faced Philip at Chaeronea and, no matter what other course Athens had taken, no matter who else had been in power, the result might well have been no different but much less glorious. Demosthenes is hardly to be held responsible for the final defeat, as he himself justly remarked.¹ So it can be argued that Demosthenes did well enough. Did he judge the situation all that badly?

My purpose here is to inquire into the judgement of Demosthenes about the affairs of a different period, the period of his full maturity, from the defeat of Chaeronea down to his triumph over Aeschines in 330. With the aid of the speeches of that year we may see more plainly what sort of judge of politics Demosthenes was. If in that period we find him, in the words of Ctesiphon's decree,² καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ we can the more confidently accept his judgement of affairs in the 340s. If we find otherwise, some may be prompted to doubt.

The speech *On the Crown* is difficult. It requires a ready familiarity with the history of the previous two decades without which the brilliance of Demosthenes' apologia is dulled. The best instance is, of course, his account of the making of the Peace of Philocrates. With admirable effrontery he can now declare that others were responsible for making the peace—Philocrates, 'your associate, Aeschines, not mine, though you lie till you are black in the face—I gave him no support at any stage'—ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ.³ The exchange of speeches of 343 makes as plain as day that this is simply not true. Indeed, according to the earlier speech of Aeschines, Demosthenes was closely connected with Philocrates as early as 348, and had in that year defended Philocrates and his proposal to negotiate with Philip, and in case the matter was forgotten Aeschines raised the matter again in his prosecution of Ctesiphon.⁴ Demosthenes omits to allude to it. In such a matter brevity was best. 'Εγὼ δ' οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ. Likewise with the charge, admittedly petty, that Demosthenes had gone ahead with the peace in 346 without consulting the Hellenes.⁵ Demosthenes first denies that Aeschines has ever aired this before: we have the text of the *Paraprosbeia* and know otherwise.⁶ As to the Hellenes, Demosthenes himself in 343 had charged Aeschines with making a shameful speech 'in the hearing of the envoys whom the Athenians sent for from the Hellenes'.⁷ Whatever the precise truth of that, the answer of Aeschines in 343 makes certain that there were some envoys from the Hellenes either present or expected. But that was 343. In 330 Demosthenes can be brief, or, rather, will not be otherwise. 'At that time there was no embassy visiting any of the Greek states, but all the Greek states had long ago been sounded, and there is not an honest word in his whole story.'⁸ Thus with sure touch Demosthenes deals with the past, exploiting bad memory, disregarding uncomfortable facts, directing attention to higher things. The speech has become one of the supreme monuments of liberty. The latest work on Athenian oratory speaks of 'the magnificent moral tone, intense, noble, sincere, transcendent',⁹ and it is by reason of the magnificent moral tone that one hopes that the speech will never be

¹ 18. 193.

² Aesch. 3. 49.

³ § 21.

⁴ Aesch. 2. 14 and 3. 62.

⁵ § 22.

⁶ Aesch. 2. 61, 62.

⁷ Dem. 19. 16.

⁸ § 23.

⁹ Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece*, p. 235.

entirely neglected in the education of the free. Moral edification and history can be kept separate.

As historians let us turn to the facts. The speech has a context. When Aeschines and Demosthenes spoke, recent and dramatic events were very much in their audience's thoughts, and the judgement given was presumably much affected by them. Aeschines divided his discussion of the career of Demosthenes into four *καιροί*, the fourth being *τὸν νῦν παρόντα καιρόν*, to which he devoted 9 sections of his speech.¹ Demosthenes dealt carefully with the first three *καιροί*; of the fourth *καιρός* he had very little indeed to say, a curious and striking silence, and it is to these events of which Aeschines says so much and Demosthenes so little that I wish to direct attention—an argument *about* silence.

The attack of Aeschines is full of rancour and he remains a suspect guide. But in one respect our task is easier for 330 than it is for 343. After Chaeronea Demosthenes' opponent ceased to play an active part in Athenian politics. His last public act was to go on the embassy to Philip immediately after the battle² and he refrained from joining those who attacked Demosthenes in the courts in that period—'daily' as Demosthenes would have it³—and his fitful appearances in the 330s appear to have been concerned solely with the case of the honorific decree of Ctesiphon.⁴ So if rancour continued deeply felt, at least Aeschines had no longer to defend his own political acts. If he misrepresents the acts of Demosthenes in these years, it is not because he has to gain credit for his own.

The curious history of the prosecution is well known. Ctesiphon's proposal to crown Demosthenes in the theatre at the Great Dionysia came before the people in the course of 337/6,⁵ presumably shortly before the festival of Elaphebolion of that year. It had been approved by the Council,⁶ but when it came before the assembly it was promptly indicted by Aeschines by a *γραφὴ παρανόμων*. The case was not proceeded with until six years later in the early weeks of the year 330/329,⁷ although by then the *προβούλευμα* would have long ago lapsed.⁸ Demosthenes curiously enough was content to let the decree lie under notice of indictment.⁹ This resumption of a case virtually dead has always caused surprise. An early reaction of scholars was to postulate a renewal in 331/0 of the *προβούλευμα*, but there is nothing in either speech to support this and enough to show plainly that the case is concerned with the decree of 337/6 and with that alone.¹⁰ It would appear that with *γραφαί* where the state was considered to be the injured party there was no time limit within which a case had to be brought,¹¹ and so there is nothing odd, from a formal standpoint,

¹ §§ 54 f., and §§ 159–67.

² Dem. 18. 282, Aesch. 3. 227. He also made public protest against the choice of Demosthenes to deliver the Funeral Oration in 338 (Dem. 18. 285).

³ Dem. 18. 249.

⁴ Aesch. 3. 216 ff., 220. Drerup, *Aus einer alten Advokatenrepublik*, p. 142, inferred from Aesch. 3. 222 that Aeschines effected a reform of Demosthenes' trierarchic law, but the passage need refer to no more than an attack on the law at the time it was proposed.

⁵ Aesch. 3. 219 (in Philip's lifetime), and 27 (Demosthenes' decree of Thargelion 338/7 providing for *τελοχοποιοί* in 337/6).

⁶ Dem. 18. 9, 118.

⁷ Dion. Hal. *Letter to Ammaeus* 1. 12 and Theophrastus *Char.* 7 give the archon year, 330/9; Aesch. 3. 254 shows that the case was heard very shortly before the Pythia, which were celebrated in every third year of an Olympiad in a month of the Delphic year corresponding to Metageitnion at Athens (cf. Beloch *G.G.*² 1. 2, p. 143).

⁸ Cf. Dem. 23. 92.

⁹ *Ἐὰν ἐν ὑπαμοσίᾳ* (Dem. 18. 103).

¹⁰ Cf. H. Reich, 'Bemerkungen zum Prozess Ktesiphon', *Abhandl. W. von Christ*, Munich, 1891, pp. 282 f.

¹¹ Cf. J. F. Charles, *Statutes of Limitations at Athens*, Chicago, 1938.

about the six-year interval in this case. But why did Aeschines choose to reopen it at all? In view of the result, it has sometimes been thought that Demosthenes found legal means to oblige Aeschines to bring his action and face the consequences, but there is a passage in Demosthenes' speech, which shows that it was Aeschines who took the initiative in 330.¹ Talking of Aeschines' retirement from politics, he remarked: *ἔστι γάρ, ἔστιν ἡσυχία δικαία καὶ συμφέρουσα τῇ πόλει, ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ὑμεῖς ἀπλῶς ἄγετε. ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτην οὗτος ἄγει τὴν ἡσυχίαν, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποστάς ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ τῆς πολιτείας (πολλάκις δὲ δοκεῖ), φυλάττει πηνίκ' ἔσεσθε μεστοὶ τοῦ συνεχῶς λέγοντος ἢ παρὰ τῆς τύχης τι συμβέβηκεν ἐναντίωμα ἢ ἄλλο τι δύσκολον γέγονεν (πολλὰ δὲ τὰνθρώπινα)· εἴτ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ καιρῷ ῥήτωρ ἐξαίφνης ἐκ τῆς ἡσυχίας ὥσπερ πνεῦμ' ἐφάνη. . . .* This passage at once seems to dispose of the notion that it was Demosthenes who brought on the case in 330, and invites speculation. What *ἐναντίωμα παρὰ τῆς τύχης ἢ ἄλλο τι δύσκολον* was there in 336 or 330? When were the Athenians *μεστοὶ τοῦ συνεχῶς λέγοντος*? Earlier another supporter of Demosthenes, Aristonicus, had moved a very similar decree, and Demosthenes had actually been crowned in the theatre without protest from Aeschines.² What in the circumstances of 336 and 330 afforded scope for his rancour?

336 was an *annus mirabilis*—for some at least. Early in the year, 'at the beginning of spring' according to Justin,³ Parmenion, Amyntas, and Attalus led a Macedonian force into Asia to prepare a bridgehead for the great invasion: the fleet landed them in the satrapy of Lydia and they were shortly in action against Memnon near Magnesia.⁴ Earlier, probably in 337, though the precise dating is obscure,⁵ Philip had got himself voted by the League of Corinth *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* but in itself this could be regarded as no more than another move of propaganda, masking Philip's real aim of dominating Greece. Now with the news of the formal consultation of Delphi and the dispatch of Parmenion with orders 'to free the Greek cities'⁶ all those in Greece who had shared the hopes of Isocrates for a national crusade saw at long last their dreams coming true. When, shortly after, Philip in his desire to commend himself to the Greeks summoned all his *ξένοι* from all over the Greek world to the celebrations in Aegae—celebrations which were to mark at once the marriage of his daughter and the opening of the onslaught on Persia—great numbers of Greeks assembled and Philip received a number of honorific crowns from both individuals and cities. Included was a crown from Athens, and at the end of the honorific

¹ § 308.

² Dem. 18. 83, 223.

³ 9. 5. 8.

⁴ Justin 9. 5, Diod. 16. 91, Trog. 9 prol. (*praemissa classe cum ducibus*), Polyaeus 5. 44 (operations against Memnon).

⁵ It is commonly supposed that Philip's settlement of the affairs of individual Greek cities was completed over the winter of 338/7, that the League of Corinth was founded early in 337, at the assembly described by Justin 9. 5, and that the meeting recounted in Diod. 16. 89 (for which cf. *P. Oxy.* i, no. 12, col. iii) at which Philip was appointed *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* was a later meeting, which could well be in early 336. But it is to be noted that none of our sources describes two sessions, and in

Justin the invasion of Asia follows as a direct consequence of the session he describes. Nothing is known of Philip's movements in 337. There seems no strong reason against supposing that there was only one session attended by Philip in 337, though the synod no doubt met at the Isthmia of 336 and at any previous national festivals after the formation of the League, as was laid down for the League of 302 (*I.G.* iv². 1. 68, i. 67) and as it was due to meet at the Pythia of 330 (Aesch. 3. 254). So the League of Corinth may not have been founded until well on in 337, after Demosthenes' decree appointing the *τειχοποιοί* (Aesch. 3. 27); Demosthenes may have acted in the shadow of the king's presence.

⁶ Diod. 16. 91.

decree read out by the herald came the words 'if anyone plots against Philip the king and flees to Athens, he is to be handed over'.¹ Here is a startling change from the day when Ctesiphon was confidently proposing a crown for Demosthenes *ὅτι διατελεῖ καὶ λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ*. For we may be sure that Demosthenes would never have proposed or supported that honorific decree for Philip.²

It seems reasonable to explain this change of opinion at Athens in terms of the flowering of Panhellenist hopes, for which Demosthenes could have no sympathy. Ever since the disaster of Chaeronea the whole effort of Demosthenes had been directed to securing the city from the coming assault. To that end he had sought stocks of corn for the city and busied himself with the city's defences, with walls and trenches.³ Indeed Ctesiphon's decree began with praise for Demosthenes *ὅτι τὰς τάφρους τὰς περὶ τὰ τεῖχη καλῶς ἐτάφρευσε*.⁴ This involved even the destruction of *ταφαὶ δημόσιαι*. It was a period of intense activity for Demosthenes.⁵ He was attacked in the courts,⁶ and it was advisable for him to have an agent to move his decrees,⁷ but none the less it was to Demosthenes that the people looked. He was chosen to deliver the funeral oration at the Epitaphia in late October 338,⁸ at which time the aged Isocrates in despair committed suicide.⁹ It was a black time, with Philip present in person in Greece, a time of awful disillusionment for the Panhellenists, when Demosthenes' gloomy predictions must have seemed all too likely to come true. His request to be appointed *εἰρηνοφύλαξ*¹⁰ was perhaps a piece of grim irony. For it is hard to see what else is meant than a request to be appointed a Theoric Commissioner, which he certainly became for 337/6, and by using this curious word he may have meant ironically that as chief finance officer he would guard the city.¹¹ Nor was the foundation of the League of Corinth any real reassurance. The work of exile was concluded, the garrisons installed to fetter Greece; what matter the fine pretensions of the League Charter? Philip had his fit instrument of domination. The battle had been fought on the seventh day of the second Attic month.¹² Nine and a half months later we find Demosthenes moving a decree to provide for regular work on the walls:¹³ the repairs of the

¹ Diod. 16. 91.

² *I.G.* ii². 240, a proxy decree for a Macedonian, moved by Demades in the tenth prytany of 337/6, is another sign of this change of mood. But one must be careful not to make too much of the change. *I.G.* ii². 239, a decree in honour of an Alcimachus, passed in the sixth prytany at the same session of the ecclesia as that at which Demades moved the decree published by Schweigert in *Hesperia* ix, 1940, p. 325, may relate to the honours accorded to Alcimachus and Antipater of Macedon and attacked by Hyperides (Harpocration s.v. *Ἀλκίμαχος*); this interpretation of the inscription was adopted by Tod, *G.H.I.*, no. 180. The name, Alcimachus, common enough at Athens (cf. *P.A.*), by no means necessarily belongs to a Macedonian (cf. *I.G.* ii². 238, which mentions the son of an Amphoterus of Andros), but, if it is a Macedonian whom the Athenians were honouring

in the sixth prytany of 337/6, the honours may well stem from the foundation of the League of Corinth (see p. 167, n. 5, above). None the less the contrast between the honours for Demosthenes proposed by Ctesiphon and those for Philip in the decree of Diod. 16. 91 is very startling.

³ Aesch. 3. 27, Plut. *Mor.* 851 A, B, Dem. 18. 248, Din. 1. 78.

⁴ Aesch. 3. 236.

⁵ Dem. 18. 248, Din. 1. 78.

⁶ Dem. 18. 249, 25. 37 (with Scholiast), Plut. *Dem.* 21, *Mor.* 845 F.

⁷ Aesch. 3. 159, Plut. *ibid.*

⁸ Dem. 18. 285 f., Plut. *ibid.*

⁹ Cf. Mathieu, *Les Idées politiques d'Isocrate*, pp. 172 f.

¹⁰ Aesch. 3. 159.

¹¹ Cf. *J.H.S.* lxxxiii (1963), 56.

¹² Plut. *Cam.* 19.

¹³ Aesch. 3. 27.

period directly after the battle¹ were now to be improved upon. For Philip was in Greece, the worst was to be expected, Demosthenes was on guard, poised, as it were, for Ctesiphon's crown. Then all changed. Not long after Aeschines had blocked the crowning; Demosthenes' position was completely undermined. The law of Eucrates menaced the Areopagus on which Demosthenes, oddly but certainly, had been able to rely.² The whole mood of the people towards Philip had changed. It seems reasonable to suppose that it was the opening of the Asiatic campaign that had, for the moment, discredited him.

But the *annus mirabilis* was only half run. Early in the new archon year came the news of Philip's death, which brought Demosthenes out of mourning for his daughter to proclaim his exultation and feverishly to exploit the new situation. An embassy was sent off, in secret, to Attalus in Asia, and, armed with a letter from Demosthenes, it succeeded in concerting plans for revolt. Meanwhile Demosthenes declared that Alexander would never venture outside Macedon.³ At any rate it could be expected that the Asiatic campaign would be postponed indefinitely, and with Demosthenes supreme again Aeschines had lost his chance.

The supremacy was short-lived. News came that Alexander was on his way south, then that the Thessalians had decreed a campaign against Athens, soon after that the Amphictyons at Pylae had voted Alexander the ἡγεμονία of the Hellenes. Demosthenes ran away from the embassy to Alexander in Boeotia.⁴ He must have been again discredited. Yet too much had happened since Ctesiphon's decree to encourage Aeschines to risk a prosecution against Demosthenes. Would the new king continue his father's leniency towards the Athenians? No one could be sure, and Aeschines was content to leave the case untested.

So much for the first act of the drama. Why the second act was so long delayed must remain something of a mystery. We know too little about conditions in Athens to say much. Yet perhaps something can be said. Presumably

¹ Dem. 18. 248.

² For the Law of Eucrates (*S.E.G.* xvii. 26) see Meritt, *Hesperia* xxi (1952), 355, Ostwald, *T.A.P.A.* lxxxvi (1955), 125-8, and Sealey, *A.J.P.* lxxix (1958), 71-3. The law was passed in the ninth prytany of 337/6, and so fell in the very period of reaction against Demosthenes. The appointment of the nomothetai probably belongs to the first prytany of the year (cf. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution*, pp. 299 f.), but this particular law may well be a product of developments later in the year.

For the curious co-operation between Demosthenes and the Areopagus cf. Sealey, art. cit.

The Law of Hegemon (Aesch. 3. 25), which destroyed the importance of Demosthenes' position as Theoric Commissioner, may belong to 337/6. It is prior to 335/4, in which year the ἀντιγραφεύς is again found taking an important part (*I.G.* ii². 223 c and 1700, l. 217; cf. Bus.-Swob. *G.S.*, p. 1043 n. 1 and Cawkwell, *J.H.S.* lxxxiii (1963), p. 57

n. 63). Hegemon was an opponent of Demosthenes (Dem. 18. 285), and while his law was of wide-ranging effect in financial matters (cf. *I.G.* ii². 1628, l. 300), it may have been directed at the position of Demosthenes in particular: the law referred to in Plut. *Life of Lycurgus*, *Mor.* 841 c, may be Hegemon's (and D. M. Lewis may well be right in his—unpublished—suggestion that his name has dropped out between φθάσαι and νόμον); this law contained the curious provision μή πλείω πέντε ἐτῶν διέπειν τὸν χειροτονηθέντα ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια χρήματα in which πέντε ἐτῶν may be a misrepresentation of πεντετηρίς, and the provision prevented Lycurgus from holding financial office indefinitely, but it may have been directed at the control of finances by Demosthenes since 341/0 (cf. Cawkwell, *C.Q.* n.s. xiii [1963], 135).

³ Plut. *Dem.* 22. 2 f., Aesch. 3. 77, 160, 219, Diod. 17. 3 and 5. 1.

⁴ Aesch. 3. 161, Plut. *Dem.* 23, Diod. 17. 4. 5 f.

Aeschines was waiting for his chance to return to the attack, but until the campaign of Gaugamela the future remained very uncertain. In early 335 Alexander went fighting in the Danube basin and for the purpose used ships from Byzantium.¹ Perhaps to this context we should assign Demosthenes' speech opposing the Macedonian Alcimachus; on some occasion Demosthenes opposed a Macedonian request for ships, declaring that it was not clear that Alexander would not use the ships against Athens itself.² Certainly Alexander must have been regarded with the greatest suspicion in this period,³ and the people were ready to accord a hearing to Demosthenes. He had in the past predicted the worst. The worst may only have been postponed.⁴ It was no time for Aeschines to attack, and when the revolt of Thebes had ended in appalling disaster Demosthenes was secure. Nor did the opening of the campaign of 334 nor the panoplies from the Granicus,⁵ nor other similar acts, necessarily persuade anyone that Alexander was not shortly going to attack the Athenians. Nor until he had left the Mediterranean seaboard were suspicions somewhat allayed. By then the situation for Aeschines' rancorous purpose had begun to change radically. The second act of the drama could now perhaps commence.

Within the archon year 331/0 came the news of Gaugamela, with the propagandist announcement that 'all the tyrannies were destroyed'.⁶ This must have reached Athens towards the end of the Julian year 331,⁷ and by then Greece, or rather Athens, was confronted with the spectacle of the revolt of Agis, of which it is now necessary briefly to indicate the chronology.

Since Niese,⁸ it has been fashionable to fasten on the explicit notice of Curtius Rufus⁹ that the battle of Megalopolis had been fought and lost before the battle of Gaugamela, and to find a sign of the outbreak of the revolt in Arrian's notice¹⁰ that, when in spring 331 Alexander was in Tyre, he dispatched Amphoterus with a heavily reinforced fleet to support the loyal Peloponnesians because τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ . . . αὐτῷ νενεωτερίσθαι ἀπήγγελλτο.

¹ Arr. *Anab.* 1. 3. 3.

² *Fr.Gr.Hist.* 72 F 16. Plut. *Mor.* 847 C (στρατευομένων δ' αὐτῷ ἐπὶ Πέρσας καὶ αἰτοῦντι ναυτικὸν παρ' Ἀθηναίων ἀντείπεν, ἀδῆλον εἰπὼν, εἰ οὐ κατὰ τῶν παρασχόντων χρήσεται) suggests a date in or after 334, but Athens could not refuse a request in accordance with the decisions of the League of Corinth. So perhaps ἐπὶ Πέρσας is inaccurate.

³ Bellenger, *Essays on the Coinage of Alexander the Great*, p. 14, inclines to the view that the figure of Athena on the gold staters was inspired by Athenian sources. (Cf. Perlman, 'The Coins of Philip II and Alexander the Great and their Pan-Hellenic Propaganda', *Num. Chron.* n.s. v. [1965], 63 f.) Even if this were true, it would be far from arguing any cordiality in 336/5: Alexander may have sought to conciliate by such a borrowing, but it would be no evidence about the Athenian response to it. But the whole question of these coins is very open.

⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 1126 D (ὁ δὲ πεμφθεὶς πρὸς

Ἀλέξανδρον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἀσίᾳ κατοικοῦντων Ἑλλήνων, καὶ μάλιστα διακαύσας καὶ παροξύνσας ἀψασθαι τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πολέμου, Δήλιος ἦν Ἐφέσιος, ἐταῖρος Πλάτωνος) fits into a period of uncertainty as to whether Alexander would follow up the attack begun by Attalus and Parmenion.

⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 1. 16. 7.

⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 34. 1.

⁷ Cf. Burn, *J.H.S.* lxxii (1952), 84 for the date of Gaugamela. The news must have reached Greece about two months later.

⁸ *Geschichte der griech. und maked. Staaten* i (1893), pp. 497 ff. Cf. Beloch, *G.G.* iii². ii (1923), pp. 317 f., and followed by many, e.g. Ehrenberg *P.W.* iii A 2, col. 1419 (1929), Treves, *Demostene e la libertà greca* (1933), p. 101, Bengtson, *G.G.*² (1960) p. 346, and most recently Badian, art. cit., pp. 190 f. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* i (1948), p. 52 puts the battle of Megalopolis 'soon after Gaugamela'.

⁹ 6. 1. 21.

¹⁰ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 3.

Thus the revolt is made to run from spring to autumn 331. I believe this chronology is wrong.

Whatever date we ascribe to the outbreak of the revolt, it was not over, as Curtius asserts, by the time of the battle of Gaugamela but continued into 330. There are two pieces of evidence that point to this, both undervalued by Niese. The first is the notice of Justin¹ to the effect that Alexander received the news of the end of Agis' revolt after the death of Darius, which as we know from Arrian² happened in the first month of the Attic year 330/29. According to Niese, Justin's words are mere *Übergangsformel*, a way of introducing a digression on the revolt of Agis which Justin, like Curtius,³ found in his source at this point. Even if this were true, it does not explain why the digression was made after the death of Darius, rather than after his defeat. The reasonable inference from Justin's words is that the revolt had ended not long before.⁴ The second piece of evidence is from Aeschines.⁵ At the time of the prosecution of Ctesiphon the Spartans (whom the Synedrion of the League of Corinth had decided to send to Alexander for sentence) had not yet been dispatched on their way. If the battle of Megalopolis had been fought and lost by October 331, these Spartans would have been sent off long before the first month of the new Attic year, 330/29. Admittedly, some time must have elapsed since the end of the revolt, but there is no reason to think that the Synedrion did not meet promptly to deal with the guilty, or that, once the decision was taken to refer the case of Sparta to Alexander, there was a long delay in putting the decision into effect. So Aeschines, like Justin, argues for the continuance of the revolt well into 330.⁶

For the date of the outbreak of the revolt, we must turn to Diodorus,⁷ who gives the first part of his account after Gaugamela, introducing it in these words—ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων (i.e. the new archons) εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τῆς περὶ Ἀρβηλα μάχης διαδοθείσης πολλὰ τῶν πόλεων ὑφορώμεναι τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν Μακεδόνων

¹ 12. 1. 4.

² *Anab.* 3. 22. 2.

³ Curtius recounts the death of Darius in the last chapter of Book 5. The beginning of his account of Agis' revolt in Book 6 is lost. For a retrospective digression introduced in a similar way to that of Justin, see 10. 1. 44.

⁴ Diodorus in Book XVII appears to have followed the same source as Curtius (cf. C. Bradford Welles, *Diodorus Siculus VIII* (Loeb), 1963, p. 12), and, while his disposition of the narrative of the revolt may be as fitful as much else in his history, it is notable that if he (and Curtius) found the account of the revolt in his source after the death of Darius (17. 62), he transposed its commencement to bring it into close connection with Gaugamela and put its conclusion after the death of Darius in chapter 75, and if he had found in his source a statement corresponding to that of Curtius 6. 1. 21, it is hard to see why he did not recount it all in the one place. His disposition of the material suggests that he knew that the revolt began before Gaugamela and was settled some considerable time afterwards. Curtius 5. 1. 1

suggests, however, that in their common source the revolt was not recounted (as it is in 6. 1) in a single narrative. Diodorus may accurately reflect the disposition of the revolt in their source.

⁵ 3. 133.

⁶ A further argument might be advanced from Arrian. After subduing the Mardi in 330, shortly after the death of Darius in Hekatombaion, Alexander returned to camp and found there four Spartans and Dropides, the Athenian, οἱ παρὰ βασιλέα Δαρεῖον ἐπρέσβευον (*Anab.* 3. 24. 4). On Niese's chronology, one can only remark that they had been a remarkably long time in not reaching Darius; on my view their arrival so late is not difficult to explain. Dropides might have left Athens during the waverings discussed below on p. 173, n. 2. (Arrian may be misleading here: Curtius 3. 13. 15 reports these ambassadors, with slight variations in spelling, as being captured after Issus; but probably Berve, *Alexanderreich* ii, s.v. Δρωπίδης is right in preferring Arrian.)

⁷ 17. 62.

ἔγνωσαν, ἕως ἔτι τὰ Περσῶν πράγματα διαμένει, τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἀντέχεσθαι· βοηθήσειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς Δαρεῖον καὶ χρημάτων τε πλῆθος χορηγήσειν πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι ξενικὰς μεγάλας δυνάμεις συνίστασθαι καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον μὴ δυνήσεσθαι διαιρεῖν τὰς δυνάμεις. εἰ δὲ περιόψονται τοὺς Πέρσας καταπολεμηθέντας, μονωθήσεσθαι τοὺς Ἕλληνας. . . . If Diodorus meant that the revolt began after news of Gaugamela reached Greece in late 331, he was talking, as Badian notes,¹ 'complete nonsense: after "Arbela" the Persian cause was stone dead and Darius, a helpless fugitive, could not have sent money to Greece even if he had wanted to'. It is evident that Diodorus' source thought that the revolt began before the defeat of Darius, and that the words τῆς περὶ Ἀρβηλα μάχης διαδοθείσης either are an inept attempt to relate the events of one chapter to those of that preceding or are to be understood as a condensed version of some statement to the effect that the revolt began when word was brought that the decisive conflict was soon to be expected. Whichever is correct, it seems clear enough from Diodorus' introduction that the revolt began before the battle of Gaugamela. The only serious question is how long before. For Badian 'positive indications in Arrian make the date certain. In late spring (3. 6. 3) Alexander, in Phoenicia, hears of "rebellion" in Peloponnese.' What Arrian says, however, might perfectly well apply to the petty disturbances of the Peace alluded to in [Dem.] XVII,² and what Alexander did was very much more suited to the situation prior to the revolt of Agis. Once Agis had defeated Corragus³ and called on the Greeks to revolt, what was needed was no mere fleet off the Peloponnese, but a land force within it. But if it had been the case, as Badian claims, that Antipater was known to be preoccupied with the revolt of Memnon⁴ and so all that Alexander could do was to send a naval force, Alexander's conduct would have been very strange indeed. Having sent the naval force which could effect little (and it is to be noted that it does not appear in Diodorus' account either of the Macedonian reaction to the revolt or of the operations), Alexander would have been leaving Thrace in revolt and Greece aflame and calmly marching towards the heart of Iran, and his next act with regard to the war, of which we hear, was to send 3000 talents to cover Antipater's expenses late in 331 when he was at Susa⁵—a tardy subvention indeed. One might accept that Alexander could act with the indifference and foolhardiness which the Niese chronology ascribes to him, but it is hard to believe that Agis could have been so stupid or his allies so bold. All hope of success for the revolt depended on Alexander's not being able to go to Antipater's aid. But if it were claimed that the revolt of Memnon tempted Agis into folly, that would have been no reason why Agis was able to find allies.

All difficulties vanish if the truth lying behind the extravagant assertions of Aeschines⁶ and Dinarchus⁷ is that the revolt began when Alexander was

¹ Art. cit., p. 191.

² In §§ 26 f. the speaker discusses the most recent 'outrage'. A Macedonian trireme had sailed into the Peiraeus and requested the building of μικρὰ πλοῖα. Perhaps the trireme came from the fleet of Amphoterus. We know, at any rate, of no other circumstances in which the Macedonians might request μικρὰ πλοῖα: it must have been for a naval force of more than one ship, if we may trust the use of the plural. The speech is a call to

the Athenians to accede to Agis' appeal for allies (cf. § 30, and Cawkwell, *Phoenix* xv [1961], 74 f., where, however, I was still espousing Niese's dating of the revolt).

³ Aesch. 3. 165.

⁴ Diod. 17. 62. 4.

⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 16. 10.

⁶ 3. 165. The Scholiast comments ἐν ὑπερβολῇ. He does not say that the statement is wholly false.

⁷ 1. 34.

already well on his way east from the Mediterranean seaboard. According to Aeschines, when Agis appealed to Athens for help, Ἀλέξανδρος ἔξω τῆς ἄρκτου καὶ τῆς οἰκουμένης ὀλίγου δεῖν πάσης μεθειστήκει. If Aeschines had said this within sixteen months of Alexander's being in Phoenicia at the moment that Agis revolted, he would have absurdly blunted the point he was making against Demosthenes. At the very time that Alexander sent Amphoterus to the Peloponnese, he also favourably received an Athenian embassy.¹ So, many would have known where exactly Alexander had been at the time that Agis appealed, if that appeal came in spring 331. Aeschines could lie no doubt, happily enough, but only when it suited his case. If Alexander had in fact been in a position to go to help Antipater when Agis' appeal came to Athens, Aeschines should have said nothing about him. So the truth would seem to be that when the revolt began Alexander was already marching to Gaugamela—a point that did not elude Memnon.

In face of the explicit evidence of Curtius to the contrary, Niese may never lack his followers, but the chronology posed here, and consistent with all the other evidence,² is that the revolt began in late summer 331 and continued well into 330. Curtius has erred. The final settlement was not long before Aeschines' attack on Ctesiphon.

If this chronology is correct, it is abundantly clear that those³ who have sought to explain the resurrection of the charge against Ctesiphon in terms of the collapse of the revolt of Agis are on the right lines. Where I differ from my predecessors is in the explanation I would furnish of why the failure of the revolt of Agis should, in Aeschines' opinion, have rendered Demosthenes more vulnerable. To this question I will now turn.

It is a remarkable fact that of the six crowded years between the citing of Ctesiphon's law under the *γραφὴ παρανόμων* in March 336 and the hearing of the case in August 330 Demosthenes has nothing precise to say—there are one or two very general remarks,⁴ but not a word about his many activities about

¹ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 2.

² There is a story in Plut. *Mor.* 818 E about Demades curbing his countrymen, when they wanted to support the revolt, by telling them that they would be depriving themselves of the money he had provided for distribution at the Choes (in February). It is accepted as genuine by de Falco, *Demade oratore*², p. 23 and rejected by Treves, *Athenaeum* N.S. xi (1933), 118. The setting, if not the details, of the story may be correct: if the revolt did continue into 330, the serious wavering of opinion at Athens, which the story implies, is understandable after the collapse of hopes of Darius defeating Alexander, and may be echoed in the wavering of Demosthenes (Aesch. 3. 167 καὶ πάλιν ὅτε κύκλῳ περιδινὼν σεαυτὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος ἔλεγε . . . κ.τ.λ.), which may be the point of Aesch. 3. 254. See p. 171, n. 6 for the Athenian ambassador, Dropides, sent to Darius: if they had been sent off before Gaugamela, presumably they would have

turned back when they learned the result.

The reinforcements, which reached Alexander at Ecbatana in May 330 (Curtius 5. 7. 12), came from Cilicia, and there is nothing to suggest that they were Macedonians (*pace* Beloch, *G.G.* iii². 2, pp. 317 f.). So the question of when and in what circumstances they were dispatched by Antipater does not arise. However Beloch, *ibid.*, may be right in arguing that the reinforcements which reached Alexander in late 330 (Curtius 6. 6. 35), including 3,000 from Illyria sent by Antipater, must have left Europe early in 330. But this does not prove that the revolt of Agis was finished. Once Antipater saw that few states had joined Agis and indeed that he could rely on the support of the League of Corinth (Diod. 17. 63. 1), he could afford to let these forces go.

³ Notably Blass, *Att. Bered.* iii². (1893), p. 419. Cf. Glotz-Cohen, *Hist. Gr.* iv², p. 208, Martin-Budé, *Eschine* ii, p. 14.

⁴ §§ 253, 270.

which we happen to learn from other sources. In Aeschines' treatment of Demosthenes' career¹ he touched on the defensive measures taken immediately after Chaeronea. Demosthenes dealt with that.² But not a comment about his part in the unrest in Greece on the death of Philip,³ or about his part in the debates occasioned by the revolt of Agis.⁴ Why did Demosthenes neglect to answer Aeschines about all this? It will barely suffice to reply that Demosthenes limited himself to events preceding the decree of Ctesiphon in 336. If it had been his intention to treat as irrelevant to the defence of Ctesiphon more recent events, he would surely have made this clear. But he does no such thing. His speech is subtly woven together. Aeschines had pointed the way to a clear answer. He does not get it. Instead Demosthenes cunningly intersperses discussion of his *acta* with other matter, and the form of the Aeschinean attack is forgotten. The uncovered years escape notice. There is art behind this careful avoidance, and Demosthenes' purpose must be sought.

One topic on which Demosthenes was silent is particularly striking—namely his part in the Theban revolt of 335. Equally striking is the silence of Aeschines on this subject. He has the merest allusion to Demosthenes' share. The Athenians, he says, gave a home to the Thebans, who were in exile *διὰ τοῦτον*.⁵ But that is all, when it would seem that there was much for him to comment on. Certainly Dinarchus had his say a few years later, though he does not greatly help in the elucidation of the facts.⁶ It seems clear that Demosthenes had some part in persuading Athens to support the revolt. Diodorus declares that the Athenians were persuaded by Demosthenes to pass a decree promising the Boeotians military support,⁷ and, according to Justin, Demosthenes brought a man before the assembly who declared that he had been wounded in a battle against the Triballi in which Alexander had been killed—the same rumour that undid the Thebans.⁸ There is also evidence that Demosthenes provided the Thebans with arms.⁹ So Demosthenes certainly played a prominent part at the outbreak of the revolt. Further, despite the deliberately confusing account of Dinarchus,¹⁰ it is plain that the Arcadians responded to the Theban appeal for help and came to the Isthmus, where they received both a message from Antipater on which they declined to act—presumably a demand that they join the Macedonian attack on Thebes—and also an appeal for help from Thebes to which they decided not to respond:¹¹ by then Alexander was known to be alive and could be expected south shortly.¹² In these negotiations with the Arcadians Demosthenes played some part. According to Dinarchus,¹³ he refused to use the money he had received from Persia to bribe the Arcadian commander into continuing north. According to the document appended to the Plutarchean Lives of the Orators, Demosthenes checked the Peloponnesians going to Thebes to help Alexander.¹⁴ The truth is lost, but whatever in

¹ §§ 159–67.

² §§ 248 ff.

³ Aesch. 3. 160.

⁴ Aesch. 3. 165 f.

⁵ Aesch. 3. 156.

⁶ 1. 18 f.

⁷ 17. 8. 6.

⁸ Justin 11. 2, Arr. *Anab.* 1. 7. 2.

⁹ Diod. 17. 8. 5, Plut. *Dem.* 23. 1.

¹⁰ 1. 18.

¹¹ Arr. *Anab.* 1. 7. 4 and 10. 1, Diod. 17. 8.

6, Din. 1. 18. As Reichsverweser under Alexander (as under Philip; cf. Berve, op. cit. ii, p. 46) Antipater was in Macedon at the time of the revolt (cf. Arr. *Anab.* 1. 7. 6). A message by sea could quickly reach the Isthmus.

¹² Diod. 17. 8. 6 *προσδοκίμου τοῦ βασιλέως ὄντος*.

¹³ 1. 20. Cf. Aesch. 3. 240.

¹⁴ *Mor.* 851 B.

fact he did, he was held to blame in part for what Athens had done. Alexander's special fury was directed against Charidemus whom he forced to flee into exile, but Demosthenes and the other popular leaders were sufficiently involved to need the diplomacy of Demades.¹ In all this there was ample material for Aeschines. He alluded to the Arcadian expedition in another context,² but he declined to use it in his attack on Demosthenes for his acts since 338. Presumably the whole subject of the destruction of Thebes was too dangerous and might recoil on the accuser; if Demosthenes had helped, or wanted to help, the Thebans, it could hardly stand to his discredit. So Aeschines contented himself with the merest allusion to his opponent's share. But what of Demosthenes? How are we to explain his silence? Could he not easily enough have explained his part? He did not initiate the revolt. The Thebans must have taken the step for themselves; such, at any rate, is the account of Diodorus, such the implication of Dinarchus, who would not have let slip any opportunity to attack Demosthenes. The revolt began, as Arrian shows,³ with the irruption into the city of exiles, who after 338 did not need a Demosthenes to prompt them. Demosthenes could easily have justified his gift of arms.⁴ If it was Demosthenes who persuaded the Athenians to pass the decree, it was not Demosthenes who persuaded them not to send out the force, but to wait and see how things turned out.⁵ At any rate, no source as much as suggests it. So he had nothing to be ashamed of here. Nor in the affair of the Arcadians at the Isthmus, as far as we can guess, and to be named by Alexander as a wanted man was an honour which his accuser could not claim. Yet he is silent about it all. Aeschines' sly reference was allowed to pass.

One explanation that might be suggested is that Demosthenes was unwilling to talk frankly about 335 for fear of Macedonian reprisals. Aeschines in the course of his speech threw out the improbable charge that through the agency of his friend, or rather associate, Aristion of Plataea, Demosthenes had been negotiating with Alexander⁶—improbable, but none the less possible; the story found its way into the history of Marsyas of Pella, who followed the career of Alexander down to his return to Syria in spring 331.⁷ So it might be claimed that after this seeming rapprochement Demosthenes was unwilling to say too much.⁸ But this will not do. He was virtually on trial, and at a moment of his opponent's choosing; Demosthenes had to do his best, whether it was reported to Alexander or not; anyhow the revolt of Thebes was past history, and Demosthenes had been held guilty and then pardoned. What had he to conceal about 335? Alexander had known all too well.

Nor will it suffice to modify this and say that Demosthenes passed over his part in the events of 335 because, if he had dealt with that, he would have been drawn into discussion of more recent events which might compromise him anew with Macedon. From the Macedonian point of view Demosthenes had behaved himself wonderfully well in the year of Agis' revolt. When Agis appealed to Athens, as to the rest of Greece, to support the revolt, 'the Athenians', to quote Diodorus, 'who had been favoured beyond all other

¹ Diod. 17. 15, Arr. *Anab.* 1. 10. 6, Justin 11. 4. 12.

² Aesch. 3. 240.

³ *Anab.* 1. 7. 1.

⁴ It is to be noted that Plut. *Dem.* 23 confuses the events of 336 and 335 (as does

Justin 11. 2) but there is no difficulty in disentangling them.

⁵ Diod. 17. 8. 6.

⁶ § 162.

⁷ *Fr.Gr.Hist.* 135 F 2.

⁸ Cf. Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, p. 439 n. 1.

Greeks by Alexander, did not stir'.¹ Not that there were wanting extremists to advocate joining the revolt—the 17th speech of the Demosthenic corpus is the clear testimony of that—but Demosthenes supported the policy of keeping out,² as I shall shortly discuss. So he could be in no great danger from the Macedonians if he spoke the truth about 335. The reason for his silence must lie nearer home.

The explanation here proposed is this. Demosthenes could have answered Aeschines about 335, but about later events he could have had little but bad conscience. To attempt an apologia for what he had done and what he had not done, would have been to make clear that he was claiming the crown at the very moment when his country was disastrously isolated. The Persian Empire was ended; the great revolt of Agis was over. No obstacle remained to Macedonian domination without end. With Thebes gone, and Sparta gone, and the heart of Greece crushed, what future in mid 330 could an Athenian see? And what had he, Demosthenes, done to aid the last great struggle? Nothing, and worse than nothing. He had seen to it that nothing was done. Aeschines³ had concluded his prosecution with an appeal to the jury not to neglect what Demosthenes passed over in silence, τὰ παραλειπόμενα. Τὰ παραλειπόμενα were to conceal the unpalatable truth.

There is one topic in particular on which Demosthenes is resolutely silent. In the whole of the *de Corona* there is only one direct reference to the King of Persia, and that a reference to a period long past.⁴ Of the reigning king, Darius, and his connections with Greece, there is not the faintest hint. Not so Aeschines, who alluded six times in his speech to the moneys which he claimed Demosthenes had received from the Persians,⁵ and at one point the claim is made that Demosthenes received communications from the Great King.⁶ The charge of collusion with Persia is in fact the final taunt of the speech.⁷ Why was Demosthenes silent about it? Others were not. Not just his accusers in 324, Dinarchus⁸ and Hyperides,⁹ but historians.¹⁰ There was a case to answer, or a course to justify. The facts appear to have been these. Having rejected the offer of *φιλία* and *συμμαχία* made by Artaxerxes in 344,¹¹ the Athenians not long after turned to Persia, perhaps in accordance with the advice of Demosthenes in the Fourth Philippic,¹² and received from the King a curt refusal to furnish Athens with money.¹³ As Philip's intention to attack Persia became clear, the mood changed¹⁴ and, probably in 336, Darius, acceding¹⁵ to the throne when Macedonian forces were already in Asia, began to take positive steps to encourage the Greeks to revolt.¹⁶ In accordance with long-established Persian policy, money was sent to Greece. According to Aeschines¹⁷ the Athenians declined to accept the 300 talents offered to them, and, according to Dinarchus,¹⁸ they

¹ 17. 62. 7. For the favours cf. Arr. *Anab.*

3. 6. 2.

² Aesch. 3. 165 f.

³ § 259.

⁴ § 202. The references to 'the barbarians' in 253 and 270 are vaguely general.

⁵ §§ 156, 173, 209, 239, 250, 259.

⁶ § 164.

⁷ § 259.

⁸ 1. 10, 15, 18.

⁹ *Against Demosthenes*, cols. 17, 21, 25.

¹⁰ Diod. 17. 4. 7 f., Justin 11. 2. 7.

¹¹ Cf. Cawkwell, *C.Q.* n.s. xiii (1963),

121 ff.

¹² § 33.

¹³ Aesch. 3. 238.

¹⁴ Arr. *Anab.* 2. 14. 5, Diod. 16. 75, etc.

¹⁵ 336 is the probable date of Darius' accession; cf. Swoboda, *P.W.* iv. 2, col. 2205. Diod. 17. 6. 2 synchronizes the accession with the death of Philip. The chronographers vary; Swoboda prefers John of Antioch *frag.* 38.

¹⁶ Arr. *Anab.* 2. 14. 5, Diod. 17. 9. 5.

¹⁷ 3. 239.

¹⁸ 1. 10.

directed the Areopagus to investigate whether any politician had taken any of this money. Since Aeschines and Dinarchus are here talking about public business, they may well be correct. Much more doubtful is the frequently repeated charge that Demosthenes received money. Practically every source asserts it,¹ but accounts vary about the amount, and the date,² and the Areopagus did not find anyone guilty. One would be justified in dismissing the whole story about Demosthenes' share as mere law-court slander, if it were not that Plutarch in his life claimed that Alexander found at Sardis documentary evidence both of communications between Demosthenes and the Persian generals and of payment of money.³ So whatever the precise truth, there is something to explain.

The merest novice to Athenian history knows that accusations of bribery are an inevitable part of political abuse, and hardly deserve to be taken literally. Not of course that politicians did not receive δῶρα—the general presumption in Athens that they did was no doubt grounded on ample experience of venality in high places. Demosthenes may well have received money from Persia, some of which he spent on supplying arms to the Thebans in 335. But whether he did or not is not important. What is important is to ask, as always in such cases, why he was so accused. There can only be one answer, and that is that from the accession of Alexander onwards, Demosthenes was known to be looking to Persia. He was, in Aeschines' phrase,⁴ ὁ μετὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ὁμολογῶν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἀντιπράττειν. That must be why at the time of the campaign of Issus he went around, according to Aeschines, flaunting letters from Cilicia, and predicting that Alexander would be trampled down by the Persian cavalry.⁵

Co-operation with Persia was in the circumstances the only policy which offered any hope of liberation, and Aeschines' mention of the dead of Marathon and Plataea was as absurd as it was ill judged. If the so-called Hellenes of the League of Corinth thought otherwise, no matter.⁶ But there were two modes of co-operation with Persia, the one represented by Demosthenes, the other by Agis. Demosthenes' policy appears to have been to do nothing until Alexander was either checked or defeated by Darius. Early in 331 the embassy sustained by all the Paraloi went before Alexander and secured all they sought, including the release of Athenians taken at the Granicus:⁷ presumably Demosthenes supported the move; at least that much may be inferred from the stories of his rapprochement with Alexander.⁸ Alexander, reassured that his erstwhile opponents at Athens would not be willing to support Agis in the policy he had been following for the last two years, was happy to make concessions to Greek sentiment. Nor was his confidence misplaced. When later in the year the revolt

¹ See p. 176 nn. 5–10, above, to which add Plut. *Mor.* 847 f.

² Plut. *Mor.* 848 E puts the embassy of Ephialtes before Chaeronea, in which he is followed by Drerup, op. cit., pp. 145 f., who cites the gift to Diopeithes (Ar. *Rhet.* 1386^a14).

³ 20. 4 f.

⁴ 3. 259.

⁵ 3. 164. Another passage (§ 254) is sometimes misunderstood; see Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, p. 103 n. 6, who says that it 'probably

refers to the Spartans'. It almost certainly does not: the Spartans had already been dealt with by the Synedrion, nor had the πολιτεύματα of Demosthenes supported them. The probable reference is to Demosthenes' policy of co-operating with Persia against the League of 'the Hellenes' (cf. 259), which had been at war with Persia; hence διαβέβληται ἡ πόλις . . .

⁶ See previous note.

⁷ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 2.

⁸ *Fr.Gr.Hist.* 135 F 2, Aesch. 3. 162.

of Agis flared up with the defeat of the Macedonian Corragus,¹ Elis, Achaea, Arcadia all joined in, but Athens held firm. Demosthenes opposed participation. Athens, he declared, was in no position to act. Such was his view of co-operation with Persia.²

The conduct of Agis has, by contrast, seemed to many foolhardy in the extreme.³ We know in fact very little about either his motives or his methods, and it is hard to evaluate his role in the Persian resurgence in the Aegean in 333 and 332. Certainly it all came to nothing and appears to have done little to shake the Greek states in their submission to the League of Corinth, which at the Isthmia of 332 by implication condemned him in expressing its loyalty to Alexander.⁴ But in one respect Agis was right. He saw as Alexander saw⁵ that naval power in the Aegean was vital to the cause of Greek freedom, and that, once Alexander had conquered the Phoenician naval bases, direct military co-operation with Persia would be impossible. While Demosthenes was smiling over the prospect of Issus,⁶ Agis was active,⁷ and, when the battle was lost, it was Agis who gathered up what he could of the remaining forces.⁸ As the Persian initiative petered out in the course of 332, Agis was left in isolation—not important enough to deter Alexander from his advance into Asia. When news came to him in spring 331 of disturbances in the Peloponnese,⁹ he had no reason to fear very much: the petty troubles described by the orator of the 17th speech of the Demosthenic corpus could easily be contained by the Macedonians in Greece itself.¹⁰ To make doubly sure, he gave orders for the reinforcement of the Macedonian fleet in the Aegean.¹¹ As he marched inland he could forget Agis.

Demosthenes, on the other hand, had strong reason not to forget Agis or the events of the previous two years. It had been a pleasant dream that Darius would destroy Alexander, and that the Greeks would again be free. But Issus should have shattered it. The result of leaving the struggle entirely to the Persians had been an immense increase in Macedonian power. The best that could be hoped for was an opportunity to liberate Greece while Alexander was engaged elsewhere. Refusal to take any risk might well end in eternal submission to Macedon.

In the course of 331 the moment for decision came. The minor military success of Agis against the Macedonian Corragus came at a time when Alexander and the flower of the Macedonian army were already approaching the battlefield of Gaugamela. At the same moment Antipater, his regent, was engaged in dealing with disturbances in Thrace:¹² he was bound to be delayed in restoring order in Europe. Agis had the nucleus of an army, the 8,000 survivors of Issus, but if he was destroyed there was no real hope of an uprising in

¹ Aesch. 3. 165. For Corragus, see Berve, *op. cit.* ii s.v.

² Aesch., *ibid.*, Din. 1. 35, Diod. 17. 62. 7.

³ For a defence of Agis, see now Badian, *Hermes* xcv (1967), 170 f. with whose general viewpoint this article is consonant. (I should add that the original versions of both papers were delivered in 1965 but were entirely independent of each other.)

⁴ Diod. 17. 48. 6, Curtius 4. 5. 11.

⁵ Arr. *Anab.* 2. 17 (Alexander's speech on the necessity of securing Persian sea-bases).

⁶ Aesch. 3. 164.

⁷ Cf. Niese, *op. cit.*, pp. 102 ff.

⁸ Diod. 17. 48. 1 f., Curtius 4. 1. 39.

⁹ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 3.

¹⁰ It may be conjectured that Corragus was one of οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι.

¹¹ Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 3.

¹² Curtius 5. 1. 1 speaks of activity 'in Illyriis ac Thraecia', but what he refers to 'in Illyriis' is not clear. For Thrace Diod. 17. 62. 4 f.

Greece in Alexander's lifetime. Only a disputed succession to the Macedonian throne would offer a real chance, and the king was so young in 331 that the revolt must have seemed the last chance for Greece. Athens possessed the all-important naval power. The response of Athens would determine the response of the rest of Greece. When Agis appealed for help, Demosthenes faced the most important decision of his career, either to urge his country to fight for liberty or merely to continue to hope for a Persian victory.

Demosthenes chose the safe course. That is clear enough from what Aeschines¹ and Dinarchus² say. The reasons he gave for rejecting the appeal are obscure. Aeschines claimed to quote some of Demosthenes' phrases, of the precise meaning of which we cannot be sure, but the general sense seems to be that Athens in Demosthenes' view was not free to act. One must inquire what was to hinder her joining the revolt. First no doubt was fear for the corn-supply. Macedon controlled Egypt; Macedon controlled the Hellespont and the Bosphorus; the great corn shortage of the early 320s may have already begun.³ But Athens had more ships in this period than ever before—392 triremes and 18 quadriremes in 330/29⁴ and could have fought for mastery of the sea as she was to fight against much increased Macedonian power in the Lamian War. The risk of being starved into submission was great, but not such as to make it impossible for Athens to join the revolt. Secondly, there were the Macedonian garrisons in Corinth, Thebes, and Chalcis. But the importance of these to the Macedonians was merely to gain time for the army to arrive. If the army were merely Antipater's, the garrisons could be swept aside or disregarded as they were in the Lamian War. Thirdly, although details are denied us, we may presume that some Athenian forces were involved in Asia, if not in the army of Alexander, at least on lines of communication, and until they returned as they probably did at about the time of the prosecution of Ctesiphon, they were hostages for Athens' good conduct.⁵ Perhaps, too, there were Athenian ships with the fleet of Amphoterus, which would find it difficult to escape, even if they could not be forced to fight. But neither military nor naval contingents are

¹ 3. 165.

² 1. 34 f. (Dinarchus, curiously, omits the Arcadians. Diod. 17. 62. 7 says that *Πελοποννησίων οἱ πλείους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινές* . . . joined the revolt.)

³ Cf. Dem. 18. 89, Din. 1. 36 (*τὰς τῶν πενήτων ἀπορίας*).

⁴ *I.G.* ii². 1627, ll. 266–78. The naval power available to Alexander in 331 was large. In the siege of Tyre he had employed 200 ships from eastern Mediterranean waters, principally Phoenicia and Cyprus (cf. Berve, op. cit. i, pp. 161 f.). From these forces he was able to dispatch the 100 ships to help Amphoterus in 331 (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 6. 3), who already had certainly 60 ships (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 2. 6), possibly 160 (Curtius 4. 5. 14 regarded by Berve loc. cit. as a mistake: 160 was the strength of the 'Hellenic' navy in 334—Arr. *Anab.* 1. 11. 6, and 18. 4). But Alexander's power was new, and the loyalty of the states uncertain. They could have no great interest in containing a revolt of Greece to the advantage of Alexander before

the Persian power was finally put out of account by the battle of Gaugamela. On paper there was something approaching a balance of power, but the resolution of Athens would have prompted other Greeks to fight and at least some of Alexander's forces to be lukewarm. Fighting would have been necessary, but victory not impossible.

⁵ The Athenian naval contingent in 334 was only 20 ships (Diod. 17. 22. 5) out of a total of 160 (see previous note), and this is so small as to suggest that the city had other obligations. Cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 16. 6 . . . καὶ τριήρεις ἔδει παρέχειν . . . καὶ ἵππεις. We never hear of Athenian cavalry in Asia, but there were more soldiers from mainland Greece than the literary sources show: for instance, the Boeotian cavalry, attested epigraphically (Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, no. 163) make no appearance in the battles (cf. Diod. 17. 57. 3 f.). Presumably such forces were used on communica-

likely to have been large, and for the greater good they would have to be risked. It is, in short, hard to see what really prevented Athens from responding to Agis' appeal. There would be opposition within the state, but it would have been the business of Demosthenes and his associates to fight it.

Demosthenes misjudged the situation. At the end of 331/0 Sparta had ceased to count; Persia was in the power of the conqueror. It was a suitable moment for Aeschines to attack. It is no wonder that Demosthenes maintained a careful silence about recent events.

No doubt there are many who would counter in Demosthenes' defence that, if his policy was in the outcome unsuccessful, he was able to retain the esteem of the Athenians to such an extent that Aeschines was roundly defeated and did not obtain the necessary one-fifth of the votes. I fear this is less of a defence of Demosthenes than the disclosure of a melancholy fact about Athens. Modern historians make much of the violent and tyrannous rule of Macedon over Greece after 338 and especially after 336. The only evidence for this view is in the speech, *On the Treaty with Alexander*, which as evidence is of the poorest.¹ The truth is much worse. Macedon did not need to interfere. Enough of the Greeks were cowed. In that sense Chaeronea had been decisive. The policy of collaboration was readily accepted, and Demosthenes and Athens were no exception. From 335 on Athens remained safe for Alexander—not that he thought they regarded him as friend, but he knew that they would not risk destruction. Since 338 they had had three calls to arms. Three times they had finally not moved, and Alexander had no reason to regret that he had left Demosthenes and his fellow demagogues to their own devices. Their own devices turned out to be remarkably convenient for Macedon, and the Athenian people were happy to accept their avoidance of danger. Over four-fifths of the votes were cast in support of Demosthenes but at the same moment in condemnation of Athens.

Demosthenes was right to say nothing about 336 to 330 in his reply. His chosen policy had ended in disaster. It was better to dwell on the struggles of the 340s, about which memories were inexact and where there was ample play for oratory. Modern students of Demosthenes also will turn to those years and continue the debate about this decisive period. Could defeat by the Macedonians have been avoided? That is the central question. But when we address ourselves to this question, if we find that Demosthenes was not so clearly right as his fame has made him, the conclusion need not shock us when we reflect on Demosthenes' policy in those years about which the *de Corona* maintains so discreet a silence.

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¹ Pace Badian, *J.H.S.* lxxxi (1961), p. 28 and n. 87. It is to be noted that of the passages he cites in n. 88, there is no proof that the (dubitable) anecdote in Plut. *Alex.* 74. 2 concerns Greeks and not men from elsewhere in the large area administered by Antipater, while Justin 12. 14. 4 f. refers to Alexander's execution of satraps, not to any acts of Antipater. The only evidence known to me which might be used to support the

common view is provided by the *διάγραμμα* of Polyperchon (Diod. 18. 56) which contained a clause restoring to their cities *τοὺς μεταστάντας ἢ φυγόντας ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων στρατηγῶν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἀφ' ὧν χρόνων Ἀλέξανδρος εἰς τὴν Ἀσίαν διέβη*. But this need be no more than a convenient starting-point to include the events of 331/0 as well as the Lamian War.